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Abstract
We consider the pricing problem faced by a seller who assigns a price to a good that confers
its benefits not only to its buyers, but also to other individuals around them. For example, a
snow-blower is potentially useful not only to the household that buys it, but also to others on
the same street. Given that the seller is constrained to selling such a (locally) public good via
individual private sales, how should he set his prices given the distribution of values held by the
agents?
We study this problem as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the seller chooses and an-
nounces a price for the product. In the second stage, the agents (each having a private value
for the good) decide simultaneously whether or not they will buy the product. In the resulting
game, which can exhibit a multiplicity of equilibria, agents must strategize about whether they
will themselves purchase the good to receive its benefits.
In the case of a fully public good (where all agents benefit whenever any agent purchases),
we describe a pricing mechanism that is approximately revenue-optimal (up to a constant fac-
tor) when values are drawn from a regular distribution. We then study settings in which the
good is only “locally” public: agents are arranged in a network and share benefits only with
their neighbors. We describe a pricing method that approximately maximizes revenue, in the
worst case over equilibria of agent behavior, for any d-regular network. Finally, we show that
approximately optimal prices can be found for general networks in the special case that private
values are drawn from a uniform distribution. We also discuss some barriers to extending these
results to general networks and regular distributions.
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1 Introduction
Pricing products for sale is an important strategic decision for firms. Based on the demand at
different prices, an optimal price should maximize the number of items sold, times the revenue per
sold item. A long history of work in economics, and more recently in computer science, studies the
problem of finding an optimal price (or, more generally, selling mechanism), given a demand curve
or estimate thereof [30, 29, 26, 18].
This view ignores the fact that products frequently exhibit externalities: if a consumer j pur-
chases the product, it may affect the utility of consumer i. These externalities naturally differ in two
dimensions: (1) whether they are positive or negative, and (2) whether they affect other consumers
when they purchase the product, or when they do not purchase it.
Some of the classical literature in economics [21, 22, 23, 24, 10] focuses on negative externalities
experienced by consumer i as a result of j’s purchase, regardless of whether i himself purchases.
Motivating examples are weapons or powerful competitive technologies. If a competitor j has access
to these technologies, it poses an often significant threat to i, and hence, i would be willing to pay
significant amounts of money to prevent j from acquiring the product. There has been a recent
focus on positive externalities between pairs i, j when both purchase [19, 5, 1, 4, 16, 7]. This type
of scenario arises, for instance, for implicit creation of technology standards, where the use of a
particular technology (such as an operating system or cell phone plan) becomes more advantageous
as others use the same technology. In this context, the focus is often on finding the right “seeds”
to create enough implicit peer influence effects; de facto, some users are offered much lower prices
to serve as seeds.
In the present paper, we investigate important domains of externalities, and the impact they
have on pricing decisions. Our main focus is on positive externalities from purchasers on non-
purchasers. In other words, when one customer purchases an item, others will derive utility from
it, even if they themselves do not purchase it. This is the case commonly known as public goods in
economics [32, 6, 27]. Public goods arise in many real-world scenarios:
1. If one researcher acquires a useful piece of infrastructure (such as a poster printer), other
research groups in the same department profit as well.
2. If one family purchases a useful and expensive gardening tool, its neighbors can borrow the
tool and use it as well.
3. If a company finances useful infrastructure in a region, it also makes the region more attractive
for other companies. One concrete example is the Wi-Fi networks that Google recently built
in Chelsea and in Kansas City [28], which are expected to attract more talent to those areas.
Since the goods described above benefit an entire group of agents, one way of purchasing them
would be to gather as a group, purchase a single copy, and split its cost among the group members.
This is, however, not always possible due to various reasons: in case (1), regulations might allow
a researcher to pay for a printer from his grant budget, but not to pay for it partially; in case
(2), the family might consider it impolite to ask each potential borrower of the gardening tool to
contribute to it; and in case (3), the companies that will benefit from the infrastructure being in
place might be competitors and therefore might be unwilling to cooperate. More fundamentally, it
has been long known that rational agents in these types of settings have incentives to misrepresent
their true utilities (see, e.g., [32]), a phenomenon colloquially known as free-riding. Hence, it is
very common that, despite the public-good nature of these goods, purchases are made privately;
that is, one agent purchases the good, incurring the entire cost alone, while benefiting the group
as a whole. It is crucial for a seller who is offering the product for sale to take these externality
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considerations into account.1 Overall, we would expect the demand for such items to be reduced
given that the buyers, taken as a whole, will demand fewer copies.
We model the locally public nature of the good as follows. We consider a graph G that captures
the interactions between the buyers. Each buyer has a non-negative valuation drawn independently
from a distribution F common to all buyers. If the buyer or one of his neighbors purchases the
good, he obtains his valuation as utility; if he was the one purchasing it, then the good’s price (set
by the seller) is subtracted from his utility. We study the Nash Equilibria of the game described
above and the problem faced by the seller of setting a price (based on the graph and the valuation
distribution) in order to optimize the revenue at equilibrium.
In investigating this question, we are interested in understanding the influence of the different
parameters on the optimal pricing choice. For example, how does the optimal price depend on the
topology of the network G? Since it is usually hard for the seller to learn the buyers’ social network,
is it possible to find a price that will generate approximately optimal revenue for any network; or,
if not, a price that depends only on simple statistics about the network, such as its average degree?
We are also interested in investigating the power of discriminatory vs. non-discriminatory pricing.
Can the seller benefit from setting a different price for each agent? Is there a non-discriminatory
price that gives a good approximation with respect to every discriminatory pricing policy?
Negative externalities and the Hipster Game Our framework can also be used to study
other types of externalities. Consider a product that serves the role of a fashion statement or status
symbol. In that case, it may be essential to the purchaser to be the only one with a copy. His
utility is, therefore, his valuation if he has the product and no other agent in his neighborhood has
it. Otherwise, his utility is zero. We call this the Hipster Game. We show that the pricing problem
in the Hipster Game is analogous to the problem for public goods, and the same algorithmic and
analysis techniques yield essentially identical results.
1.1 Our Contribution
Globally public goods We begin our study by focusing on the complete graph, i.e., the case of
globally public goods. We are interested in prices which will yield high revenue at equilibrium. One
immediate obstacle in this context is that the (Bayesian) purchasing game played by the buyers
may have (infinitely) many equilibria. We show that nonetheless, there is a single price p which can
be computed explicitly from the agents’ value distribution, and which is approximately optimal in
the following very strong sense: The revenue under the worst-case equilibrium at price p is within a
constant factor of the revenue of the best equilibrium for the best general (not necessarily uniform)
price vector. In other words, price discrimination can improve revenue by at most a constant factor,
even if one is optimistic about the equilibrium that will be reached.
Our analysis draws a relation between our problem and the optimal (Myerson) revenue of a
single-item auction among n bidders. The main insight driving our result is that, at equilibrium,
the agents aim to make purchasing decisions so that only one agent will buy the product, in
expectation. This connection allows us to leverage the rich literature on single-item auctions for
our analysis; it also explicates the connection to the Hipster Game, where positive utility can only
be derived when exactly one agent obtains the good.
1The examples listed above can be considered nearly pure public goods, in that the benefits from being the
purchaser and being a “neighbor” are very similar. A much larger number of products — such as most entertainment
technology — has a significant public component, but also a significant private component. We discuss this interesting
extension as a direction for future work in Section 5.
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Locally public goods With a solid understanding of globally public goods in place, we next turn
our attention to locally public goods, which are modeled by arbitrary networks G. At this point, we
cannot answer the question of finding optimal prices for arbitrary G. However, we make significant
progress on the question, as follows.
First, we consider the case of d-regular graphs G. Here, the results on globally public goods carry
over in spirit. However, technically, the assertion is weaker: we show how to explicitly compute a
uniform price p which, when offered to all the agents, is guaranteed to obtain a constant fraction of
the worst-case revenue for any fixed price p′. Remarkably, this price depends only on the degree d
and the distribution F , and is independent of the actual graph structure. Notice that the guarantee
is weaker than the one for globally public goods in two respects: (1) it only provides guarantees
compared to one fixed price, not a price vector with discrimination, and (2) it compares only to the
worst-case revenue for these other prices p′ (instead of the best-case one). This weaker assertion is
inevitable: we show that there exist d-regular graphs in which the gap between the best worst-case
revenue and the best revenue in equilibrium is Θ(d), and similarly, the gap between the worst-case
revenue of the best uniform price vector and the best discriminating prices is Θ(d) as well.
We next consider the case of general graphs. We present evidence that our previous approaches
will face inherent difficulties in handling general graphs. In particular, we give an instance of a
network such that, for every price, the gap between the best-case and worst-case revenue is Θ(n).
Therefore, approximate optimality of worst-case equilibria cannot be established by bounding best-
case revenues. At a minimum, this raises an equilibrium selection problem: which is the right
revenue to optimize, and to compare against?
For d-regular graphs, our solution concept is to bound worst-case revenue for the price against
the worst-case revenue at other prices p′. We show that for general graphs, this approach faces a
fundamental obstacle: approximating worst-case revenue to within a factor n1−ǫ for a given price
is NP-hard, even if F is the uniform distribution. Thus, we do not expect a concise or useful
characterization of the approximate worst-case revenue.
Surprisingly, for the specific case of the uniform distribution F , one does not need to be able
to compute the objective function in order to optimize it: for the uniform distribution F , simply
offering a price of 12 guarantees worst-case revenue within a factor at most 4/e of optimal. Unfor-
tunately, the analysis techniques for this case rely very specifically on the uniform distribution of
valuations; it is an interesting open question whether they can be extended beyond the uniform
distribution.
Related Work
Externalities in general, and public goods in particular, have a rich and long history of study in
economics. The tension arising from private provisioning of public goods has been realized since
the early studies of public goods: Samuelson [32] already noticed that private provisioning will not
necessarily achieve a social optimum. (See also the discussion in Chapter 11 of [27].) Implicit in
the study of markets for public goods in this literature is the goal of setting the right price, taking
into account production costs and utility curves. Our model differs from the classic models in that
purchase decisions are binary, whereas traditional models allow agents to choose a continuous level
xi at which to purchase the public good. Each agent’s utility in the fully public setting is a function
of
∑
i xi, whereas interpreting the xi as probabilities, the utilities in our setting are of the form
1−
∏
i(1 − xi). Thus, the analysis techniques commonly used in the literature on public goods do
not apply directly in our setting.
The study of private sales of public goods is also present in the classic paper of Bergstrom,
Blume and Varian [6] and in work by Allouch [3]. The authors consider a model in which agents
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need to split an initial endowment of public and private goods. The focus of those papers is to
prove existence and uniqueness of equilibria in such games.
In our work, we assume that the good to be allocated is fully public. There is a large body
of literature studying the effects of congestion, where a good’s value to an individual decreases as
others use it. Several works study allocation mechanisms to price such congestion effects, going
back to the original work of Pigou [31]. For overviews of pricing of congestion in public and club
goods, see [14, 20]. In the present work, the good does not become congested; instead, a graph
structure specifies which individuals derive utility from the purchases made by others.
A study of locally public goods in the graph-theoretic sense considered here2 has only been begun
much more recently, as part of the recent trend toward studying classic games in a networked
setting. (See Galleotti [15] for a general overview.) Specifically, locally public goods have been
studied by Bramoulle´ and Kranton [8] and Bramoulle´, Kranton and D’Amours [9]. Bramoulle´ and
Kranton [8, 9] study a setting in which agents decide on a level of effort; an agent’s utility grows
as a function of the cumulative efforts of himself and all his neighbors in the network. In this
sense, the model generalizes the classical public goods model to networks; as we discussed above,
in contrast, our model focuses on probabilistic decisions to purchase or not to purchase. One main
difference between [8] and our work is that, instead of merely taking the games as given, we seek
to engineer the network game by setting parameters (in our case: prices) that will lead to more
desirable equilibria (equilibria of higher revenue).
Also closely related to our model is the work of Candogan, Bimpikis and Ozdaglar [11]. This
work considers a monopolist who sets prices for agents that are embedded in a network and exhibit
positive externalities. Their model differs from ours in three main respects. First, as with the
work of Bramoulle´ et al., the level of consumption in their model is continuous rather than binary.
Second, their externality model is different in that an agent’s utility is additive over the purchases
made by his neighbors, whereas in our case, purchases of neighbors are substitutes. Third, they
adopt a full-information model, in which the auctioneer knows the demands of the agents, whereas
in our model, the agents’ values are drawn from a known distribution.
We focus our attention on mechanisms that allocate a (globally or locally) public good by way
of posted prices. Posted price mechanisms have received significant recent attention in the context
of auctions with multiple objects for sale [12, 13] where it has been shown that, in various settings,
approximately optimal revenue can be extracted by offering a vector of take-it-or-leave-it prices to
each buyer in sequence. Our analysis shares similarities with this line of work: like [12], we relate
our pricing problem to a corresponding single-item auction problem. However, unlike [12], setting a
posted price in an auction for a public good can lead to multiple equilibria of buyer behavior, with
different equilibria generating substantially different revenues.
2 Models and Preliminaries
We write [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Throughout, vectors are denoted by bold face. The buyers form the
vertices V = [n] of an undirected graph G = ([n], E). The neighbors of a node i ∈ V are denoted
by N(i) = {j | (i, j) ∈ E}, with the convention that i /∈ N(i). For an event E , we write 1{E} for
the function whose value is 1 when E happens and 0 otherwise.
We are interested in locally public goods: goods that let a player derive utility either from being
allocated the good, or from having a neighbor who is allocated the good. More formally, we define
2Past work on “local public goods” used the term to describe public goods for a community such as a small town.
As such, the term corresponds to a fully public (though possibly congestible) good, when the set of individuals under
consideration is restricted.
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utilities as follows: Each agent i has a private valuation vi for the good, drawn independently from
a common and commonly known atomless distribution F .3 Since we assume that F is atomless, for
every q ∈ [0, 1], there is at least one value of p for which F (p) = q. We write F−1(q) = min{p|F (p) =
q}.
If S is the set of agents allocated the good, and πi the payment of agent i, then agent i’s utility
is
ui(S, πi) =
{
vi − πi if i ∈ S or S ∩N(i) 6= ∅
−πi otherwise.
A natural question arises regarding whether agents i /∈ S should have non-zero payments, given
that they may profit from the allocation to their neighbors. In the present work, we focus on the
private sale of the good via posted prices, i.e., the seller determines the price of the good, and an
agent is only charged when purchasing the good. This is the most widely used mechanism for selling
goods, public or private.
We remark that since our setting is a single-parameter setting, Myerson’s theory of optimal auc-
tions [30] would yield a revenue-optimal mechanism. However, the mechanism does not correspond
to private sales since it charges not only the buyers, but also their neighbors who derive benefit
from the item.
2.1 Equilibria in the posted-prices game
The pricing decisions can be modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the seller sets a price
vector p to offer the buyers. For most of the paper, and unless specified otherwise, all agents will
be offered the same price p. Subsequently, the buyers play a simultaneous Bayesian game. The
seller’s goal is to choose p so as to maximize revenue.
We assume that the agents maximize their expected utility. Given a price pi, a player i
will buy if his utility from buying, vi − pi, exceeds the expected utility from not buying, vi ·(
1−
∏
j∈N(i) P[j does not buy]
)
. At equality, i could randomize between the two strategies, but
since we assumed the distribution F to be atomless, equality is an event of probability 0. Thus,
each agent will employ a threshold strategy: buy if and only if
vi ≥
pi∏
j∈N(i) P[j does not buy]
=: Ti.
Because all other players j also employ threshold strategies, we can write P[j does not buy] =
P[vj ≤ Tj] = F (Tj). Thus, the Nash Equilibria are exactly the threshold vectors T = (T1, . . . , Tn)
satisfying the following condition:
Ti ·
∏
j∈N(i)
F (Tj) = pi, for all i ∈ V. (1)
Given a price vector p, we use Np to denote the set of Nash Equilibria T = (T1, . . . , Tn) of
the posted prices game with prices p. We prove below that Np 6= ∅. Given a Nash Equilibrium
T ∈ Np, the corresponding expected revenue is R(p,T) =
∑
i pi · (1− F (Ti)).
3Some of our preliminary results carry over to the case when buyers have different distributions Fi.
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2.1.1 Existence of (possibly multiple) Equilibria
To prove the existence of at least one equilibrium, define
B =
[
p1,
p1∏
j∈N(1) F (pj)
]
×
[
p2,
p2∏
j∈N(2) F (pj)
]
× · · · ×
[
pn,
pn∏
j∈N(n) F (pj)
]
,
and consider the best-response function Ψ : B → Rn+, defined as Ψi(T) = pi/
∏
j∈N(i) F (Tj). We
claim that Ψ(T) ∈ B for all T ∈ B.
First, notice that for any T, we have Ψi(T) ≥ pi. Intuitively, this captures that, regardless of
the other players’ strategies, no player will ever buy the good for more than his value. On the other
hand, because Tj ≥ pj for T ∈ B, we also get that
Ψi(T) =
pi∏
j∈N(i) F (Tj)
≤
pi∏
j∈N(i) F (pj)
.
Thus, Ψ : B → B is a continuous function from B to B. So long as the prices are such that
F (pi) > 0 for all i, B is compact, and the existence of a fixed point (and thus an equilibrium of the
game) follows from Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem.
If there is one or more agent i with F (pi) = 0, then the following construction proves the
existence of an equilibrium. For each agent i with F (pi) = 0, set Ti = pi, and for all neighbors of
i, set Ti = ∞. In other words, i deterministically buys the good, and i’s neighbors never buy the
good. It follows directly from the definition of Ψ that the best response for all these agents will be
Ψi(T) = Ti. Since the agents with Ti =∞ contribute a term F (∞) = 1 to their neighbors’ product,
the remaining problem remains unchanged if we remove all these agents completely, and focus on
the restriction of Ψ to the remaining agents. For those, the previous compactness argument applies.
Remark 1 In general, there could be many equilibria of the game. Even for the special case of
G = Kn and F (x) = x for x ∈ [0, 1], any threshold vector T with
∏
i Ti = p is a Nash Equilibrium
of the posted-prices game with uniform prices p. Thus, there is in general a continuum of equilibria.
2.1.2 Symmetric Equilibria for d-Regular Graphs
When the graph G is d-regular, and the prices offered to the buyers are the same, i.e., pi = p
for all i, then we can show that Ψ also has a symmetric equilibrium. Notice that if T = T · 1,
then Ψ(T) = p/F (T )d · 1, so the best responses will be symmetric. It therefore suffices to study
the function ψ(T ) = p/F (T )d, and show that it has a fixed point. To see this, observe that the
condition for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium is the existence of a threshold T such that
T · F (T )d = p. Because ψ(p) = p/F (p)d and ψ(p/F (p)d) ≤ p/F (p)d, the existence of a fixed point
in the interval [p, p/F (p)d] follows by the intermediate value theorem.
2.2 Hipster Game
In this section, we consider the following variation of the game. In the Hipster Game, each agent
strives to be unique among his friends, so upon acquiring a good, he only derives value from it if
he is the only person in his social network who has this good. More precisely, if S is the set of
allocated agents, and π is the vector of payments, then:
ui(S, πi) =
{
vi − πi if i ∈ S and S ∩N(i) = ∅
−πi otherwise.
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Notice that this definition of utilities seems to give us a game which is the complete opposite of
the Public Goods Game. While the Public Goods Game was an example of positive externalities,
the Hipster Game is an example of negative externalities. In fact, this game can be described
as a congestion game: the graph nodes are congestable resources, and the resources requested by
a player are exactly all nodes in his neighborhood. While the Hipster Game is characterized by
negative externalities, it exhibits a very similar equilibrium structure to the Public Goods Game.
Player i decides to purchase the good for price pi if
vi · P[no agent in N(i) buys]− pi ≥ 0.
Therefore, the set of equilibria for this game is composed of threshold strategies for all agents such
that the thesholds satisfy pi = Ti ·
∏
j∈N(i) F (Tj) for all i.
Thus, the Public Goods Game and the Hipster Game have the same set of equilibria and also
the same revenue. (However, they are not isomorphic, since the payoff structure is not the same.)
We can use this observation to get a crude upper bound on the expected revenue of the Public
Goods Game for arbitrary graphs. We note that it is equal to the expected revenue of the Hipster
Game, which in turn is at most the expected welfare of the Hipster Game, as each agent must derive
non-negative expected utility at equilibrium. The expected welfare of the Hipster Game is at most
the expected weight of the maximum weighted independent set with weights vi drawn i.i.d. from
F . Thus, we conclude:
Lemma 2 The expected revenue from the Public Goods Game is at most the expected weight of the
maximum weighted independent set of G with node weights vi drawn i.i.d. from F .
2.3 Regularity, Myerson’s Lemma and the Prophet Inequality
Much of our analysis will be based on Myerson’s Lemma about the optimal selling mechanism,
combined with the prophet inequality. We briefly review these concepts here. A more comprehensive
exposition can be found in Hartline’s lecture notes [18].
Definition 3 (Virtual values and regularity) Let F be the cumulative distribution function of
an atomless distribution on an interval [a, b], and let f be its corresponding density function. The
virtual value function associated with distribution F is defined as φ(x) = x− 1−F (x)f(x) . The distribution
F is regular if φ(x) is non-decreasing.
Consider a single-agent scenario in which an agent with value v, drawn from F , is made a
take-it-or-leave-it offer at price p. The agent will accept the offer iff his value exceeds p, which
happens with probability 1 − F (p) =: q. Therefore, the revenue obtained by posting a price p is
p · (1 − F (p)), which can be also written in terms of the quantile space as q · F−1(1 − q). This
motivates the following definition:
Definition 4 (Revenue curve) The revenue curve corresponding to the cumulative distribution
function F is a function R : [0, 1] → R+, defined by R(q) = q · F
−1(1 − q). It specifies the revenue
as a function of the ex ante probability of sale.
The derivative of the revenue curve with respect to q is dRdq (q) = F
−1(1 − q) − q
f(F−1(1−q)) =
φ(F−1(1− q)). Since F−1 is monotone non-decreasing, a distribution is regular iff its corresponding
revenue curve is concave.
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2.3.1 Single-item auctions and Myerson’s Lemma
We draw repeatedly on the scenario in which a single item is sold to n agents with valuations
drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution F . A mechanism receives a vector of bids b = (b1, . . . , bn)
and returns an allocation vector x(b) = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ R
n
+ such that
∑
i xi ≤ 1, and a payment
vector π(b) ∈ Rn+. The mechanism is incentive compatible if no bidder can benefit from reporting
a value other than his true value, i.e., if bidding bi = vi is a weakly dominant strategy for each
agent i. Myerson [30] established the following lemma, which relates the payments of an incentive
compatible mechanism to the expected virtual values:
Lemma 5 (Myerson [30]) For any incentive compatible mechanism, and any bidder i, Ev[πi(v)] =
Ev[xi(v) · φ(vi)].
In particular, it follows from Lemma 5 that the revenue-maximizing incentive compatible mech-
anism allocates the item entirely to an agent with highest non-negative virtual value. The n-agent
Myerson Revenue is the optimal revenue that can be obtained in a setting with a single item and n
agents, and is given by RMn = E[maxi φ(vi)
+], where z+ = max(0, z). When clear from the context,
we drop the subscript n.
Lemma 5 also implies that the optimal mechanism for selling an item to a single agent is a
posted price mechanism with price r = φ−1(0), known as the Myerson Reserve Price. It follows
that the n-agent Myerson Revenue can be bounded as follows:
RMn = E[max
i
φ(vi)
+] ≤ E[
∑
i
φ(vi)
+] = n · r · (1− F (r)).
2.3.2 Posted-Price Mechanisms and the Prophet Inequality
A natural mechanism for selling a good is the sequential posted prices mechanism. In round i,
if the good has not been sold previously, the mechanism offers the good to agent i at a price of
pi. The revenue obtained by this mechanism is
∑n
i=1 pi · P[vi ≥ pi and vj < pj for all j < i] =∑n
i=1 pi · (1 − F (pi)) ·
∏
j<i F (pj). Because the sequential posted-price mechanism is incentive
compatible, and RMn is defined as the optimum expected revenue for any incentive compatible
mechanism, we obtain that for any price vector (p1, . . . , pn):
n∑
i=1
pi · (1− F (pi)) ·
∏
j<i
F (pj) ≤ R
M
n .
The result known as the Prophet Inequality guarantees the existence of a price p∗ (called the prophet
price) such that a sequential posted-price mechanism with uniform price p∗ (i.e., where pi = p
∗ for
all i) generates at least half of the optimal revenue. In other words:
n∑
i=1
p∗ · (1− F (p∗)) · F (p∗)i−1 ≥
1
2
RMn .
The Prophet Inequality (and its variants) is a powerful tool in optimal stopping theory; it was
introduced and applied in algorithmic mechanism design by Hajiaghayi, Kleinberg and Sandholm
[17]. See [2] and [25] for recent developments of the topic.
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3 Pricing globally public goods
In this section, we focus on the case of a globally public good. That is, the underlying network is
a clique, G = Kn. We assume that the common value distribution F of the agents is atomless and
regular. Our main result is the following:
Theorem 6 In the globally public good setting, let p = F−1(1 − 1/n) · (1 − 1/n)n−1. Then, if the
price p is offered to all agents, the worst-case revenue among the equilibria T ∈ Np is at least a
constant fraction of the revenue of the best equilibrium for the best (possibly non-uniform) price
vector to offer the agents.
The main insight driving Theorem 6 is that, at equilibrium, the agents aim to make purchasing
decisions in such a way that only one agent will buy the product, in expectation. With this in
mind, we draw a relationship between the public good pricing problem and a single item auction
that attempts to sell a single item to n bidders with value distributions F . We relate the revenue
at different price vectors and equilibria in the public good mechanism to the optimal (Myerson)
revenue in the single item auction. We can then apply the theory of optimal auctions to guide our
choice of pricing in the public good mechanism. We note that similar techniques have been applied
in the context of sequential posted pricing for multi-item auctions [12]. However, a novel difficulty
that we must overcome is the existence of multiple equilibria of bidder behavior for any given price;
we must therefore find a price for which all equilibria generate a good approximation to the optimal
revenue.
First, in Proposition 7, we show that the revenue of any equilibrium of any mechanism is upper-
bounded by RMn . Next, Lemma 8 shows that for the price vector p = p · 1, where p is the price
specified in the assertion of Theorem 6, the symmetric equilibrium is guaranteed to achieve at least
a constant fraction of the Myerson Revenue. Finally, in Lemma 9, we show that in every equilibrium
for this price vector p, the revenue is at least a constant fraction of that of the symmetric equilibrium
for this price vector.
A corollary of this analysis is that the ability to price-discriminate does not substantially in-
fluence revenue: a uniform price vector can extract a constant fraction of the optimal revenue
attainable by any mechanism, and hence any (non-uniform) vector of prices.
We note that while our analysis makes use of a connection to the Myerson optimal auction,
offering the Myerson Reserve Price does not necessarily extract a constant fraction of the optimal
revenue, even when F is regular. In the appendix A, we provide an example illustrating this revenue
gap at the Myerson Reserve Price.
Proposition 7 Let p = (p1, . . . , pn) be any price vector, and T = (T1, . . . , Tn) ∈ Np be an arbitrary
equilibrium of the public goods selling game with prices p. Then, R(p,T) ≤ RMn .
Proof. Using that pi = Ti ·
∏
j 6=i F (Tj) by Equation (1), we can bound the revenue as
R(p,T) =
∑
i
Ti · (1− F (Ti)) ·
∏
j 6=i
F (Tj) ≤
∑
i
Ti · (1− F (Ti)) ·
∏
j<i
F (Tj) ≤ R
M
n .
In the last inequality, we used that the sum expresses the expected revenue of the sequential posted
price mechanism in which the ith player is offered a price of Ti; therefore, the sum is upper-bounded
by the expected revenue of the optimal mechanism for selling a single item.
For the remainder of this section, we fix T such that F (T ) = 1 − 1n , and p = T · F (T )
n−1 =
T · (1− 1/n)n−1. Let p = p · 1 be the vector in which all agents are offered p.
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Lemma 8 Let T = T · 1 be the symmetric equilibrium corresponding to p. Then,
R(p,T) = n · T · (1− F (T )) · F (T )n−1 ≥
1
4
· RMn .
Proof. We use a variant of an argument by Chawla, Hartline and Kleinberg [12]. We distinguish
between two cases, based on the relation of the Myerson Reserve Price r = φ−1(0) with T .
1. If T > r, we let ν = φ(T ) > 0. We can bound the Myerson Revenue as follows:
RMn = E[max
i
φ(vi) · 1{maxφ(vi) ≥ 0}]
≤ ν · P[0 ≤ max
i
φ(vi) ≤ ν] + E[maxφ(vi) · 1{maxφ(vi) ≥ ν}].
We bound each term separately. For the first term, we have that ν = φ(T ) ≤ T , and
P[0 ≤ max
i
φ(vi) ≤ ν] ≤ P[max
i
vi ≤ T ] = F (T )
n = (1− 1/n)n ≤ 1/e.
For the second term, we have that
E[maxφ(vi) · 1{maxφ(vi) ≥ ν}] ≤ E[
∑
i
φ(vi)1{φ(vi) ≥ ν}].
By Lemma 5, E[φ(vi)1{φ(vi) ≥ ν}] is the revenue of the single-agent mechanism that makes
agent i a take-it-or-leave-it offer at price T ; therefore,
E[
∑
i
φ(vi)1{φ(vi) ≥ ν}] =
∑
i
T · P[vi ≥ T ] = T ·
∑
i
(1 − F (T )) = T,
by definition of T . Combining the bound on the two terms, we get that RMn ≤ T ·(1+1/e). On
the other hand, for the symmetric prices and symmetric equilibrium, we have that R(p,T) =
n · T · (1− F (T )) · F (T )n−1 = T · (1− 1/n)n−1 ≥ T/e. Therefore,
R(p,T) ≥
1/e
1 + 1/e
RMn =
1
1 + e
RMn ≈ 0.27 · R
M
n .
2. When T ≤ r, we upper-bound RMn as follows:
RMn = E[maxφ(vi) · 1{maxφ(vi) ≥ 0}] ≤ E[
∑
i
φ(vi) · 1{φ(vi) ≥ 0}]
= n · r · (1− F (r)),
where the final equality follows from the same argument about a single buyer as above. Let
qM = 1−F (r) be the probability that the valuation of an agent with distribution F is above
the Myerson reserve price r. Because F is regular, as argued in Section 2.3, the revenue curve
R(q) is a concave function. By the definition of the Myerson Reserve Price as the maximizer
of expected revenue, R is maximized at q = qM . Because we are in the case that T ≤ r, we get
that qM = 1− F (r) ≤ 1− F (T ) = 1n < 1. We can therefore write
1
n as a convex combination
1
n = λ · q
M + (1 − λ) · 1, with λ =
1− 1
n
1−qM
. The concavity of R, together with R(1) = 0, now
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implies that R( 1n) ≥
1− 1
n
1−qM
R(qM ). On the other hand, R( 1n) = T · (1 − F (T )); by combining
these, we obtain
T · (1− F (T )) = R(1/n) ≥
1− 1n
1− qM
·R(qM ) ≥
(
1−
1
n
)
· r · (1− F (r)). (2)
We can therefore bound the posted price revenue as
R(p,T) = n · T · (1− F (T )) · F (T )n−1 = n · T · (1− F (T )) · (1− 1/n)n−1
≥ n · r · (1− F (r))(1 − 1/n)n ≥
1
4
RMn .
The first inequality follows by Equation (2); for the second inequality, we bound (1−1/n)n ≥ 14 ,
and use that the optimal revenue from selling a single item to n agents is at most n times the
optimal revenue from selling a single item to one agent at the Myerson Reserve Price.
Having shown that the symmetric equilibrium has revenue within a constant factor of the
Myerson Revenue for a single item, it remains to analyze the asymmetric equilibria. (Recall that
p = T · F (T )n−1, where T is such that F (T ) = 1− 1n .)
Lemma 9 Let T = T · 1 be the symmetric equilibrium with threshold T , and T′ ∈ Np be an
arbitrary equilibrium. Then, R(p,T′) ≥ Ω(1) · R(p,T).
Proof. We express the revenue of the symmetric equilibrium as R(p,T) = p ·
∑
i(1−F (T )) = p.
By the Union Bound, the revenue at the equilbrium T′ is lower-bounded by R(p,T′) =
∑
i p · (1−
F (T ′i )) ≥ p · (1 −
∏
i F (T
′
i )). We will prove that
∏
i F (T
′
i ) ≤ (1 − 1/n)
n−1 ≤ 12 , which will imply
that R(p,T′) ≥ 12p =
1
2R(p,T). For contradiction, assume that
∏
i F (T
′
i ) > (1− 1/n)
n−1.
Using that p = T · F (T )n−1 = T · (1 − 1/n)n−1, applying the equilibrium condition (1) to T′,
and using our contradiction assumption, we get that for all j,
T ′j =
p∏
i 6=j F (T
′
i )
=
T · (1− 1/n)n−1∏
i 6=j F (T
′
i )
≤ T ·
(1− 1/n)n−1∏
i F (T
′
i )
< T ·
(1− 1/n)n−1
(1− 1/n)n−1
= T.
Thus, T ′j < T for all j, implying that F (T
′
j) ≤ F (T ) as well. But this contradicts that T
′
j ·∏
i 6=j F (T
′
i ) = p = T ·
∏
i 6=j F (T ), completing the proof.
4 Pricing Locally Public Goods
In this section, we turn to scenarios in which the good is not completely public. That is, the graph
G is not necessarily complete; rather, G is an arbitrary network, and agents share benefits only
with neighbors in G. We refer to such a good as locally public.
We first analyze the case when G is d-regular, for some arbitrary d ≥ 1. For such graphs, we
describe how to explicitly calculate prices that are approximately revenue-optimal, in the worst
case over equilibria of agent behavior. We then consider the case of general networks. We present
evidence that the pricing problem for general graphs is substantially more difficult, and that the
approaches used in previous cases cannot be extended to handle the general case, even for uniform
distributions. Nevertheless, we show that approximately optimal prices can be found in the special
case that agent values are drawn from the uniform distribution.
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4.1 d-Regular Graphs
We consider the problem of pricing locally public goods when the underlying graph is d-regular;
i.e., |N(i)| = d for every i ∈ [n]. As before, we assume that the value distribution F of the agents
is atomless and regular.
Recall that in the case of globally public goods (Section 3), we showed how to compute a price
for which the revenue at the worst equilibrium is a good approximation to the revenue at the best
equilibrium for any price vector. In other words, p is such that
min
T∈Np
R(p · 1,T) ≥ Ω(1) ·max
p
max
T∈Np
R(p,T).
One might hope for a similar result for locally public goods. Unfortunately, we show that this is not
possible even for d-regular networks: in Example 13, we give an instance of a d-regular graph for
which the gap in revenue between different equilibria is linear in d. The same example also shows
that for d-regular graphs, we cannot find a single price that is competitive against non-uniform
price vectors. Thus, unlike for globally public goods, a constant-factor revenue approximation for
d-regular graphs must specifically compare revenue-minimizing equilibria at given price vectors.
We establish the existence of a price p that depends only on the degree d and the distribution
F , but not on the particular structure of G, such that when p is offered to all the agents, the seller
obtains a constant fraction of the worst-case revenue at any price. In other words, we establish the
existence of a price p = p(d, F ) such that
min
T∈Np
R(p · 1,T) ≥ Ω(1) ·max
p′
min
T∈Np′
R(p′ · 1,T).
We emphasize that the key aspect here is that p is independent of the actual network structure
of G, and that it can be computed efficiently from F and d.
Theorem 10 In the locally public good setting with d-regular graphs, let p = F−1(1−1/d)·(1−1/d)d.
Then, if the price p is offered to all agents, the worst-case revenue among the equilibria T ∈ Np
is at least a constant fraction of the revenue of the worst equilibrium for the best network-specific
uniform price to offer the agents.
Our approach to proving Theorem 10 is the following. We first study the symmetric equilibria
of the game. We know from Section 2 that every uniform price vector p ·1 admits a symmetric equi-
librium. We consider a price p for which, in the corresponding symmetric equilibrium, each player
buys with probability 1d . In Lemma 11, we show that the revenue of this symmetric equilibrium is a
constant fraction of the revenue of any other symmetric equilibrium (across all potential prices). In
particular, this implies that the worst-case revenue at any other price is at most a constant factor
larger than the revenue of the symmetric equilibrium at price p. Then, in Lemma 12, we show that
for this particular price p, every equilibrium generates at least a constant fraction of the revenue of
the symmetric equilibrium.
For the remainder of this section, we fix T such that F (T ) = 1 − 1d , and p = T · F (T )
d =
T · (1− 1/d)d. Let p = p · 1 be the vector in which all agents are offered p.
Lemma 11 Consider a locally public goods problem in which the underlying network is a d-regular
graph and agents have valuations drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution F . Let T be the symmetric
equilibrium with threshold T . Then,
R(p,T) ≥ Ω(1) · R(p′ · 1, T ′ · 1),
for all prices p′ and threshold vectors T ′ · 1 corresponding to the symmetric equilibrium with price
p′.
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Proof. Let RMd be the revenue obtained by Myerson’s mechanism for selling one item to d players
with i.i.d. valuations drawn according to F . The Prophet Inequality (Section 2.3) guarantees that
there exists a price T ∗ such that a sequential posted-prices mechanism with price T ∗ offered to
all agents guarantees at least half of the Myerson Revenue RMd . On the other hand, the Myerson
Revenue is optimal, and therefore clearly serves as an upper bound on the revenue that can be
obtained by any price T of the sequential posted prices mechanism. In summary, there exists a T ∗
such that
d∑
i=1
T ∗(1− F (T ∗))F (T ∗)i−1 ≥
1
2
· RMd ≥
1
2
·
( d∑
i=1
T ′(1− F (T ′))F (T ′)i−1
)
, for all T ′. (3)
We distinguish between two cases, based on the relation of T ∗ with T .
1. If T > T ∗, then given any price p′ and corresponding symmetric equilibrium T ′,
R(p′ · 1, T ′ · 1) = n · T ′ · (1− F (T ′)) · F (T ′)d =
n
d
(
d · T ′ · (1− F (T ′)) · F (T ′)d
)
≤
n
d
( d∑
i=1
T ′ · (1− F (T ′)) · F (T ′)i−1
)
.
Using both sides of Equation (3), we get:
R(p′ · 1, T ′ · 1) ≤
n
d
· RMd ≤
2n
d
·
( d∑
i=1
T ∗(1− F (T ∗))F (T ∗)i−1
)
≤
2n
d
· T ∗. (4)
Next, we establish a lower bound on R(p,T).
R(p,T) = n · T · (1− F (T )) · F (T )d =
n
d
(1− 1/d)d · T ≥
n
4d
· T ∗ ≥
1
8
· R(p′ · 1, T ′ · 1).
For the first inequality, we bound
(
1− 1d
)d
≥ 14 , and use that T ≥ T
∗, by the assumption of
case (1); the second inequality follows from Inequality (4).
2. If T ≤ T ∗, then let q∗ = 1−F (T ∗) ≤ 1−F (T ) = 1d . Similar to the proof of Lemma 8, we use
the concavity of the revenue function R(q) = q · F−1(1− q) to derive that
T · (1− F (T )) ≥ (1− 1/d) · T ∗ · (1− F (T ∗)). (5)
It follows that
R(p,T) = n · T · (1− F (T )) · F (T )d = n · (1− 1/d)d · T · (1− F (T ))
≥ n(1− 1/d)d+1 · T ∗ · (1− F (T ∗))
≥ (1− 1/d)d+1 ·
n
d
·
( d∑
i=1
T ∗(1− F (T ∗))F (T ∗)i−1
)
≥
n
16d
·
( d∑
i=1
T ′(1− F (T ′))F (T ′)i−1
)
≥
n
16
· T ′ · (1− F (T ′)) · F (T ′)d =
1
16
· R(p′ · 1, T ′ · 1).
The first inequality follows by Inequality (5); the second inequality holds because F (T ∗)i−1 ≤ 1
for every i; the third inequality follows by Inequality (3), and by bounding (1− 1/d)d+1 ≥ 18 ;
and for the final inequality, we use that i ≤ d for every i.
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The assertion of the lemma follows.
Having shown that the symmetric equilibrium associated with price p generates a good approx-
imation to the optimal revenue attainable at symmetric equilibria, we now show that there are no
other (asymmetric) equilibria associated with price p that generate significantly less revenue.
Lemma 12 Let T = T · 1 be the symmetric threshold vector associated with price p. Then,
R(p,T′) ≥ Ω(1) · R(p,T) for any threshold vector T′ ∈ Np.
Proof. For any equilibrium T′ ∈ Np,
R(p,T′) =
∑
i
p(1− F (T ′i )) =
p
d
∑
i
∑
j∈N(i)
(1− F (T ′j)) ≥
p
d
∑
i
(
1−
∏
j∈N(i)
F (T ′j)
)
,
where the last inequality follows by applying the union bound. By the equilibrium conditions,
T ′i ·
∏
j∈N(i) F (T
′
j) = p = T · F (T )
d for all i; therefore, 1 −
∏
j∈N(i) F (T
′
j) = 1 − T · F (T )
d/T ′i .
We get that R(p,T′) ≥ pd
∑
i
(
1− T ·F (T )
d
T ′i
)
. From the last inequality and the equality R(p,T′) =∑
i p(1− F (T
′
i )), we can bound R(p,T
′) as follows:
R(p,T′) ≥ p ·
∑
i
1
2
[
(1− F (T ′i )) +
1
d
(
1−
T · F (T )d
T ′i
)]
.
Focus on one term i of the sum. The first term in brackets is decreasing in T ′i , while the second is
increasing in T ′i . Consequently, we distinguish between two cases: (i) If T
′
i ≤ T , then 1 − F (T
′
i ) ≥
1− F (T ) = 1d . (ii) If T
′
i ≥ T , then
1
d
(
1−
T · F (T )d
T ′i
)
≥
1
d
(
1− (1− 1/d)d
)
≥
1
d
·
(
1−
1
e
)
.
Thus, summing over all i, R(p,T′) ≥ p ·
∑
i
1
2
(
1
d ·
(
1− 1e
))
, implying that
R(p,T′) ≥ p ·
∑
i
1
2
(
1
d
· (1− 1/e)
)
= Ω(1) · p ·
n
d
= Ω(1) · R(p,T).
We now show that comparing against the best worst-case revenue, rather than the best revenue
in equilibrium, is a necessity rather than an artifact of our analysis.
Example 13 (Revenue gap) Consider an instance with n players whose valuations are drawn
i.i.d. from the uniform distribution with support [0, 1]. Let the underlying network be a d-regular
bipartite graph with n2 nodes on each side. We showed in Lemma 11 that the best worst-case revenue
is upper bounded by nd · R
M
d ≤
n
d (where R
M
d is the revenue obtained by Myerson’s mechanism for
selling one item to d players).
Now, consider the following equilibrium T ∈ N1/2 in the bipartite graph: the nodes on one
side buy whenever their value exceeds the price, while the nodes on the other side always free-ride.
That is, Ti =
1
2 for each player i on the left, and Ti = 2
d−1 > 1 for each player i on the right. This
equilibrium generates a revenue of n2 ·
1
2 · (1−
1
2) =
n
8 . The gap between the best worst-case revenue
and the best revenue can therefore be as large as n8 · (
n
d )
−1 = d8 .
Notice that the same instance also shows a gap between the worst-case revenue of the best
uniform price vector and the best discriminating prices. The seller can offer all nodes on the right
a price of 1 and the left a price of 12 ; in the unique equilibrium, the bidders on the right never buy
and the bidders on the left choose a threshold of 12 .
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4.2 Hardness of Bounding Revenue for General Graphs
We would like to extend the results from the previous sections beyond complete and d-regular
graphs, and find a method to compute prices that approximately optimize revenue for arbitrary
networks. Recall the nature of our analysis for Theorem 6 and Theorem 10: in each case, we
constructed a price p and then bounded the revenue of the worst-case equilibrium T ∈ Np with
respect to either an upper bound on the revenue of any equilibrium for any price vector (in the
case of Theorem 6) or the worst-case revenue for any uniform price vector (for Theorem 10). Can
we hope to extend these methods to general networks?
In this section, we show that there are inherent difficulties in extending these approaches to
handle general networks. In appendix A, we give an instance of a network such that, for every
price, the gap between the best-case and worst-case revenues is Ω(n). (The complete bipartite
graph Kn/2,n/2, generalizing Example 13, shows the same for carefully chosen prices, but not all
prices.)
One might instead hope to analyze worst-case revenues directly, as in Theorem 10. However,
we again find that this poses a difficulty in general networks. Theorem 14 (whose proof is given in
appendix B) shows that it is NP-hard to approximate the worst-case revenue for a given p, over all
equilibria T ∈ Np, to within a factor of n
1−ǫ, even when F is the uniform distribution.
Theorem 14 Assume that all agents’ valuations are drawn i.i.d. from the uniform distribution
on [0, 1]. Given a graph G with n nodes and a uniform price vector p = p · 1, it is NP-hard to
approximate the worst-case revenue to within a factor n1−ǫ.
4.3 General Graphs, Uniform Distribution
Motivated by the gap between best-case and worst-case revenue, and the approximation hardness,
we explore an alternative approach. While Theorem 14 demonstrates that we cannot hope to
compute the revenue generated by any given price, we show that for i.i.d. uniform distributions of
agent valuations, the impact of the equilibrium and of the price choice can be decoupled, so that
an approximately optimum price can be set even without knowledge of the network. It turns out
that a price of 12 gives a constant-factor approximation.
The key to our analysis is to show that, for the case of the uniform distribution, there is an
underlying structure to each equilibrium that does not depend on the price chosen by the seller.
Even further, it is possible to express revenue as the product of two terms, the first determined by
the chosen price and the second by the structure of the equilibrium selected by the agents. This
allows us to optimize the price term independently of the equilibrium structure.
Theorem 15 Let G be an arbitrary network, and assume that the agents’ valuations are drawn
i.i.d. from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Then, the worst-case revenue obtained from offering
a uniform price of 12 is at least an
e
4 fraction of the worst-case revenue for the optimum (network-
specific) price. Formally:
min
T∈N1/2
R(12 · 1,T) ≥
e
4
· max
p=p·1
min
T∈Np
R(p,T).
Proof. Given a price vector p = p · 1, an equilibrium T ∈ Np is a vector such that Ti ·∏
j∈N(i) F (Tj) = p, where F (Tj) = min{1, Tj} for the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Note that
a threshold Ti > 1 is “behaviorally” equivalent to a threshold Ti = 1, since the support of the
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valuations is [0, 1]. Applying this definition of the distribution function, the equilibrium condition
becomes
(i) Ti ∈ [p, 1]; (ii)
∏
j∈N(i)∪{i}
Tj ≤ p; (iii)
∏
j∈N(i)∪{i}
Tj < p =⇒ Ti = 1.
The worst-case equilibrium for the price vector p can therefore be expressed as the following
mathematical program:
MinimizeT∈Np R(p · 1,T) = p ·
∑
i(1− Ti)
subject to
∏
j∈N(i)∪{i} Tj ≤ p for all i∏
j∈N(i)∪{i} Tj < p =⇒ Ti = 1 for all i
p ≤ Ti ≤ 1 for all i.
We use the transformation xi =
log(1/Ti)
log(1/p) (and thus Ti = p
xi) in order to bring the program into
a form in which the constraints carry only information about the graph and are independent of the
price p. In addition, as a result, the objective function depends only on the price and not on the
graph structure. This decouples the two aspects of the problem:
MinimizeT∈Np R(p · 1,T) = p ·
∑
i(1− exp(−xi · log(1/p)))
subject to
∑
j∈N(i)∪{i} xj ≥ 1 for all i∑
j∈N(i)∪{i} xj > 1 =⇒ xi = 0 for all i
0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 for all i.
(6)
For the range y ∈ [0, log(1/p)], elementary facts about the exponential function imply the
following bounds: (1−p)log(1/p) · y ≤ 1 − e
−y ≤ y. Writing X for the set of vectors x that are feasible
for the program (6), we apply the bound on the exponential function to the program (6), obtaining
that
p · (1− p) ·min
x∈X
∑
i
xi ≤ min
T∈Np
R(p · 1,T) ≤ p · log(1/p) ·min
x∈X
∑
i
xi.
Thus, we have upper and lower bounds on the value of the worst-case revenue for each price p.
Notice that the upper bound is maximized for p = 1/e, so
max
p=p·1
min
T∈Np
R(p,T) ≤
1
e
·min
x∈X
∑
i
xi.
On the other hand, setting p = 12 maximizes the lower-bound, giving us that
min
T∈N1/2
R(
1
2
· 1,T) ≥
1
4
·min
x∈X
∑
i
xi ≥
e
4
· max
p=p·1
min
T∈Np
R(p,T).
The analysis above was based on choosing the Myerson Price for the uniform distribution, in
order to maximize the “price component” of the product; the “equilibrium component” factored
out, and contributed at most a constant-factor loss in revenue. One might suspect that the Myerson
Price would provide a constant approximation for all (regular) distributions. However, in appendix
A, we provide an example which shows that this is not the case, even for the complete network.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we initiated the study of revenue-maximal pricing for locally public goods. We
conclude by discussing potential extensions and questions left open by our work.
Simultaneous vs. Sequential purchases In our model, all agents simultaneously observe the
price of the good and decide whether to purchase. In an alternative scenario, the seller sequentially
offers the good to each agent in turn, who can then decide whether to buy given the choices of those
who came before. This leads to a pricing problem that is similar to the one studied here, except
that the natural solution concept for the pricing game becomes the subgame perfect equilibrium
rather then Nash Equilibrium. Does the increased possibility of coordination in sequential sales
unambiguously help or harm revenue?
Imperfect public goods We consider scenarios where the good is a perfect public good: the
benefit of owning it and having a neighbor that owns it are the same. Most goods, however,
have both public and private components. The purchase of a big-screen television provides some
benefit to the purchaser’s friends, who can visit and watch/play, but the greatest benefit goes to
the purchaser himself. One can consider a utility model where ui(vi, S) = vi − pi if i ∈ S, (1− ǫ)vi
if i /∈ S but N(i) ∩ S 6= ∅, and ui(vi, S) = 0 otherwise.
Strength of social ties We assumed that all links of the social network are homogeneous. One
could also consider the case in which network links are weighted. The weights might correspond to
the extent to which benefits are shared along a link. In such a case, one can assume that the network
is represented by a matrix wij where wii = 1, wij = 0 for j /∈ N(i) ∪ {i} and wij ∈ [0, 1] otherwise.
Then, the utility of agent i for an outcome S is given by ui(vi, S) = vi ·maxj∈S wij − pi · 1{i ∈ S}.
An even further generalization is to consider a submodular function fi : 2
[n] → R+ for each agent
such that his utility is given by ui = vi · fi(S)− pi · 1{i ∈ S}.
Other applications and objectives We believe that our model and techniques can be useful for
additional related settings. Consider, for example, the following snow-shoveling setting. Suppose
that a landlord of an apartment building wants to make sure that snow is shoveled from the sidewalk
in front of his building. Thereto, he imposes a fine on each tenant in the case that the sidewalk is
not shoveled. The tenants now face a problem that is similar in spirit to purchasing a public good.
Each tenant incurs a personal cost from snow shoveling, drawn from some distribution, and needs to
decide whether to exert effort (and incur the associated cost), or else pay the fine if none of the other
tenants shoveled. The landlord, in determining the fine, must balance between different objectives,
such as getting the snow shoveled, his own revenue, and the social welfare of the tenants. This is
an example of a broader class of problems in which a policy maker must decide on mechanisms that
are only applicable to individuals in order to encourage group behaviors. This example illustrates
the appeal of this problem with objectives other then revenue. We believe that this problem has a
structure similar to public goods, and that our techniques might be useful there.
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A Revenue Gap Examples
Example 16 (Revenue Gap for Myerson Reserve) Let the underlying network be the clique
G = Kn, and the valuations drawn i.i.d. from the exponential distribution F (v) = 1 − e
−v. First,
we notice that for any price p, the only equilibrium is the symmetric one: Given any price p, each
equilibrium T ∈ Np satisfies Ti
∏
j 6=i F (Tj) = p for all i, so
F (Ti)
Ti
=
F (Tj)
Tj
for any i 6= j. The fact that
F is strictly concave implies that F (T )T is strictly monotone decreasing. Therefore,
F (Ti)
Ti
=
F (Tj)
Tj
implies that Ti = Tj . So for each price, the only equilibria are symmetric ones, characterized by
the equation T · F (T )n−1 = p.
The exponential distribution has virtual value function φ(v) = v − 1; therefore, the Myerson
Reserve Price is r = 1. For this price, the threshold T applied by the agents satisfies 1 = T (1 −
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e−T )n−1 =: g(T ). Note that g(T ) is strictly increasing in T . We write m = n− 1 for convenience.
Let T1 = logm− log log logm. Then,
g(T1) = (logm− log log logm)
(
1−
log logm
m
)m−1
< (logm)
(
1−
log logm
m
) m
log logm
log logm(
1−
log logm
m
)−1
< (logm) · e− log logm = 1.
Thus, T = g−1(1) is greater than T1, and hence, F (T ) > F (T1) = 1−
log log(n−1)
(n−1) . We therefore have
R(1) = R(1, T ) = n · (1− F (T )) < 2 log log n.
On the other hand, if we set p = log n · (1 − 1/n)n−1, the corresponding threshold is T ′ =
g−1(p) = log n. We then have R(p) = R(p, T ′) = pn · (1 − F (T ′)) = p > 14 log n. The gap between
the optimal revenue and the revenue of the Myerson reserve price can therefore be as large as
Ω( lognlog logn).
Example 17 (Linear gap in revenue among equilibria) Consider a graph G composed of a
cycle of size 5; in addition, for every triple of 3 out of the 5 nodes in the cycle, there is a set of N
nodes, each connected to each of the nodes in the triple. The total number of nodes is n = 10N +5.
We choose F to be the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Pick an arbitrary price p ∈ (0, 1). We
now consider two equilibria from Np. In the first, each of the 5 buyers on the cycle chooses a
threshold of p1/3, and each of the remaining 10N buyers chooses a threshold of 1. Note that
Ti ·
∏
j∈N(i) F (Tj) = (p
1/3)3 = p for each buyer i, so this is indeed an equilibrium. The revenue at
this equilibrium is 5p(1− p1/3).
For the second equilibrium, two non-adjacent buyers on the cycle will choose threshold p. The re-
maining three buyers on the cycle, say S, will choose threshold 1. The N buyers who are adjacent to
the three nodes in S will choose threshold p; the remaining 9N buyers will choose threshold 1. Note
that Ti
∏
j∈N(i) F (Tj) ≤ p for each buyer i. Moreover, for each buyer for whom Ti
∏
j∈N(i) F (Tj) < p
(i.e., each buyer with multiple neighbors who have threshold p), we have Ti = 1. The proposed
thresholds therefore form an equilibrium. The revenue at this equilibrium is (N + 2) · p · (1− p).
Taking N to be arbitrarily large relative to p, we have that the gap between the revenue of these
two equilibria is Ω(N) = Ω(n).
B Proof of Theorem 14
In this section, we provide a proof of Theorem 14. We restate the theorem here for convenience.
Theorem 14 Assume that all agents’ valuations are drawn i.i.d. from the uniform distribution
on [0, 1]. Given a graph G with n nodes and a uniform price vector p = p · 1, it is NP-hard to
approximate the worst-case revenue to within a factor n1−ǫ.
Proof. We will use the characterization of the worst-case revenue with price p established in the
proof of Theorem 15. There, we showed that the revenue can be characterized by the mathematical
program (6), repeated here for convenience:
Minimize p ·
∑
i(1− exp(−xi · log(1/p)))
subject to
∑
j∈N(i)∪{i} xj ≥ 1 for all i∑
j∈N(i)∪{i} xj > 1 =⇒ xi = 0 for all i
0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 for all i.
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To prove approximation hardness, we give a reduction from 3-SAT. More precisely, given a 3-
SAT instance, we construct an instance of the pricing problem such that if a formula is satisfiable,
the revenue is O(1), whereas if it is not satisfiable, the revenue is Ω(n1−ǫ).
T F
Figure 1: A variable gadget.
The reduction Given a 3-SAT formula with k clauses and m variables, construct an instance of
the pricing problem as follows. For each variable in the formula, construct a “gadget,” as depicted
in Figure 1; the nodes T and F will correspond to true and false assignments, respectively. For
each clause, we introduce kL nodes (for some fixed large L), each connected to three other nodes,
as follows. For every positive literal in the clause, each of the kL clause nodes is connected to the
T-node of the corresponding variable gadget, and for every negative literal, each of the kL clause
nodes is connected to the F-node of the corresponding variable gadget
An observation on the resulting instance We observe the following fact on the instance of
the pricing problem obtained from the reduction. Let u and v be the respective T-node and F-node
of a variable gadget. We claim that all feasible solutions to the program (6) have xu, xv ∈ {0, 1}.
Indeed, let w1 and w2 be the leaf nodes of the variable gadget attached to u. We know by the
first constraint of the program that xw1 ≥ 1 − xu and xw2 ≥ 1 − xu. Therefore,
∑
i∈N(u)∪{u} xi ≥
xu + 2 · (1 − xu) = 2 − xu. If xu < 1, then
∑
i∈N(u)∪{u} xi > 1, and the second condition in (6)
implies that xu = 0. The same analysis applies to xv.
Also notice that xu = xv = 1 violates the second condition, since
∑
i∈N(u)∪{u} xi ≥ 2 > 1, but
xu 6= 0. Therefore, the pair (xu, xv) must be one of the set {(0, 1), (1, 0), (0, 0)}.
We also observe that if i is a clause node that is connected to a variable node u with xu = 1,
then xi = 0 by the second condition.
Satisfiable formula implies low worst-case revenue If the formula is satisfiable, consider a
satisfying truth assignment. If a certain variable is assigned True, then set xu = 1 for its T-node
and xv = 0 for its F-node. Apply the opposite assignment for a variable that is assigned False. For
the leaf nodes of the variable gadget, set their values to be one minus the value of their neighbor.
Finally, set xv = 0 for all all clause nodes v. Since the assignment is satisfiable, each clause node
is connected to at least one node that is assigned 1. Therefore, the worst-case revenue is at most
p · (1 − p) · 3 ·m: each node assigned 1 produces revenue p(1 − p), and there are exactly 3m such
nodes.
Unsatisfiable formula implies high worst-case revenue If the formula is not satisfiable, then
for every assignment of values xv to nodes that is feasible for (6), there exists at least one clause
whose nodes are connected to three nodes with value 0. By the first condition of the program, all
such clause variables must be set to 1. The revenue is therefore at least 3m+ kL.
Since the graph has n = 6m + k · kL nodes, by setting L to be sufficiently large, one cannot
distinguish between a solution of revenue n1−1/L and a solution of revenue O(1). This gives an
Ω(n1−ǫ) hardness for approximating the worst-case revenue, for every ǫ > 0.
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